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Abstract—Deep learning models have shown their advantage
in many different tasks, including neuroimage analysis. However,
to effectively train a high-quality deep learning model, the
aggregation of a significant amount of patient information is
required. The time and cost for acquisition and annotation in
assembling, for example, large fMRI datasets make it difficult to
acquire large numbers at a single site. However, due to the need to
protect the privacy of patient data, it is hard to assemble a central
database from multiple institutions. Federated learning allows
for population-level models to be trained without centralizing
entities data by transmitting the global model to local entities,
training the model locally, and then averaging the gradients or
weights in the global model. However, some studies suggest that
private information can be recovered from the model gradients or
weights. In this work, we address the problem of multi-site fMRI
classification with a privacy-preserving strategy. To solve the
problem, we propose a federated learning approach, where a de-
centralized iterative optimization algorithm is implemented and
shared local model weights are altered by a randomization mech-
anism. Considering the systemic differences of fMRI distributions
from different sites, we further propose two domain adaptation
methods in this federated learning formulation. We investigate
various practical aspects of federated model optimization and
compare federated learning with alternative training strategies.
Overall, our results demonstrate that it is promising to utilize
multi-site data without data sharing to boost neuroimage analysis
performance and find reliable disease-related biomarkers. Our
proposed pipeline can be generalized to other privacy-sensitive
medical data analysis problems.
I. INTRODUCTION
Data has non-rivalrous value, a term from the economics
literature [1], meaning that it can be utilized by multiple parties
at a time to create additional data products or services. Pooling
data together will have synergistic effects. For example, for
developing a deep neural network for image recognition tasks,
it is essential to have a training set of images with 10, 000
tags in ImageNet [2] consisting of publicly available, manually
annotated information. However, similar data at scale tend to
not be available in healthcare, resulting in a lack of general-
izability and accuracy for models and concerns regarding the
reproducibility of results. Sharing large amounts of medical
data is essential for precision medicine, with one important
example being functional MRI (fMRI) data related to certain
neurological diseases or disorders. The time and cost for
acquisition and annotation in gathering large fMRI datasets
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make it difficult to recruit large numbers at a single site. Deep
learning models have shown their advantage in fMRI analysis
[3], [4]. Without assembling data from a number of different
locations, the typically limited amount of data available from
a single site becomes an obstacle to building an accurate deep
learning model for neuroimage analysis.
However, there are many concerns regarding medical data
sharing. For example, patients might be concerned about
sharing their medical data, due to the risk that it will be shared
with employers or used for future health insurance decision-
making if their data are stored and accessed by multiple users,
even when deidentified [5]. There are questions about whether
deidentified data are truly anonymous. From a legal point of
view, data sharing is regulated by different federal and state
laws. The power of regulation might vary due to the content
of the data, its identifiability, and the context of its use [6].
Many governmental agencies have their own privacy and data-
sharing policies [7]. In addition, health systems are concerned
that competitors will be able to use their data when they
compete for customers. Providers worry that if their health
statistics are publicly available, they will lose patients or be
sanctioned if they cannot assess their performance [8].
To tackle the data-sharing problem, Federated learning
[9] was introduced to protect privacy by using training data
distributed among multiple parties. Instead of transferring data
directly to a centralized data warehouse for building machine
learning models, in a federated learning setup, each party
retains its data and performs decentralized computing. Hence,
federated learning addresses privacy concerns and encourages
multi-institution collaboration.
Fig. 1: fMRI distribution of dif-
ferent sites
Another problem
existing in utilizing
data from different
parties is domain shift.
Diverse domains of data
are common because
institutions can have very
different methods of data
generation and collection.
The scanners used in
different institutions
may be from different
manufacturers, may be
calibrated differently and may have different acquisition
protocols specified. For example, in data from the Autism
Brain Imaging Data Exchange (ABIDE I) [10], the University
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2of Utah School of Medicine (USM) site used a 3T Siemens
TrioTim MR scanner, the New York University (NYU) site
used a 3T Siemens Allegra MR scanner, while the University
of Michigan (UM) site used a 3T GE Signa MR scanner.
Also, the instructions given to each subject were different
at different sites. The USM site told participants to ”Keep
your eyes open and remain awake, letting thoughts pass
through your mind without focusing on any particular mental
activity” while participants at the UM site looked at a fixation
cross in the middle of the screen and participants at the
NYU site were asked to look at a white cross-hair against a
black background that was projected on a screen but some
participants’ eyes were closed during scanning. Figure 1
shows the heterogeneous fMRI data distribution of NYU and
USM sites, although both of the sites used the scanners from
the same manufacturer. One of the challenges of imaging
studies of brain disorders is to replicate findings across
sites. Federated learning, together with domain adaptation
methods, has the potential to extract reliable, robust neural
patterns from brain imaging data of patients having different
psychiatric disorders.
Our contributions are summarized as follows:
1) We formulate a new privacy-preserving pipeline for
multi-site fMRI analysis and investigate various prac-
tical aspects of the federated model’s communication
frequency and privacy-preserving mechanisms.
2) To the best of our knowledge, we investigate domain
adaptation in federated learning for medical image anal-
ysis for the first time. Domain shift due to heterogeneous
data distribution is a challenging issue when utilizing
medical images from different institutions.
3) We propose to evaluate performance based on the
biomarkers detected by the model, in addition to direct
assessment of accuracy metrics.
Paper structure: In Section II, we summarize related work
about federated learning and unsupervised domain adaptation,
the two techniques we focus on in this paper. In Section III,
we introduce the methods used for our study. Specifically,
in Section III-A, we propose the privacy-preserving federated
learning setup for multi-site fMRI analysis; in Section III-B,
we propose two domain adaptation methods to boost federated
learning performance; and in Section III-C, we proposed the
biomarker detection and evaluation methods. The experiments,
results, and evaluation methods are presented in section IV. We
conclude the paper in Section V.
II. RELATED WORK
A. Federated Learning
Generally, federated learning can be achieved by two ap-
proaches: 1) training individual models and a meta-model
is constructed from the sub-models, and 2) using encryption
techniques to allow safe communications between different
parties [11]. In this way, the details of the data are not
disclosed in between each party. In this paper, we focus on
the first approach, which has been studied in [12], [13], [14].
Obtaining sufficient data is a major challenge in the field of
medical imaging. Apart from data collection, labeling medical
image data that require expert knowledge can be addressed by
the collaboration between institutions. However, there are lots
of potential legal and technical issues when sharing medical
data to a centralized location, especially among international
institutions. In the medical imaging field, multi-institutional
deep learning without sharing patient data was firstly inves-
tigated in [15]. Later, another work [16] empirically studied
privacy-preserving issues using a sparse vector technique and
investigated model weights sharing schemes for imbalanced
data. We note that the randomization mechanism for privacy
protection and domain adaptation issues have not been studied
in federated learning for medical images. We address these two
issues in our study.
B. Domain Adaptation
Domain Adaptation aims to transfer the knowledge learned
from a source domain to a target domain. Then, a model
trained over a data set from a source domain is further
refined to adapt to a data set from a different target do-
main. Unsupervised domain adaptation methods have been
extensively studied [17], [18], [19], [20], [21], [22], [23],
[24]. However, these efforts cannot meet the requirements of
federated settings: data are stored locally and cannot be shared,
which hinders adaptive approaches in mainstream domains
because they require access to source and target data [25],
[26], [27], [28], [21], [22]. Federated domain adaptation has
been recently proposed [29], [30]. In our study, we investigate
adopting those two federated domain adaptation methods in
our multi-source and multi-target federated learning domain
adaptation problem.
III. METHODS
A. Basic privacy-preserving federated learning setup
In this section, we formulate multi-site fMRI analysis with-
out data sharing in a federated learning framework. Then we
introduce the randomized mechanism for privacy protection.
Finally, we show the details of training such a privacy-
preserving federated learning network step by step.
1) Problem definition: Let matrix Di denote the data held
by the data owner site i. Define N sites {F1, . . . .FN}, all of
whom wish to train a deep learning model by consolidating
their respective data {D1, . . . .DN}. For medical imaging
problems, usually, the data size at each site is limited to train
a good deep learning model. A conventional method is to
put all data together and use D = D1 ∪ · · · ∪ DN to train
a model MMIX . At the same time, some data sets may also
contain label data. We denote the feature space as X , the label
space as Y and we use I to denote the sample ID space. The
feature X , label Y and sample IDs I constitute the complete
training dataset (I,X ,Y). In our multi-site fMRI classification
scenario: Di is fMRI data, Fi is the institution owning private
fMRI data; X is the extracted fMRI feature and label Y can be
the diagnosis or phenotype we want to predict. In this setting,
data sets share the same feature space but are different in
samples. For example, different sites have different subjects.
3Fig. 2: The simplified example of privacy-preserving federated learning strategy for fMRI analysis.
However, the features are all fMRI signals extracted from the
same preprocessing pipeline. Therefore, we can summarize the
data distribution as:
Xi = Xj , Yi = Yj , Ii 6= Ij , ∀Di,Dj , i 6= j, (1)
which belongs to the horizontal federated learning category
where different data sets have large overlap on features while
they have small overlap on samples [11].
In this scenario, due to regulation and other issues, each
medical institution will not share data with the other parties.
A federated learning system is a learning process where the
data owners collaboratively train a model MFED, in which
any data owner Fi does not expose its data Di to others. In our
problem setting, assume there is a central server for computing
(not for data storage). All the different medical institutions
(sites) use the same deep learning architecture for the same
task. Each institution trains the deep learning model in-house
and updates the model weight information to a central server
at a particular frequency during training. The shared weights
are covered by additive random noise ε to protect data from
inverse interpretation leakage. Once the central server receives
all the weights, it summarizes them and updates the new
weights to each institution. The simplified pipeline is depicted
in Figure 2.
2) Privacy-preserving decentralized training: The simpli-
fied federated learning framework is depicted in Figure 2,
which contains two key steps in decentralized optimization:
1) local update, and 2) communicating to a global server. The
detailed training procedure is presented in Algorithm 1, where
the objective function is cross-entropy loss:
Lce = −[y log(p) + (1− y) log(1− p)] (2)
where y is the label and p is the model output, which estimates
the probability of that label, given an input.
Algorithm 1 Privacy-preserving federated learning for multi-
site fMRI analysis
Input: 1. X = {X1, . . . , XN}, fMRI data from N insti-
tutions/sites; 2. fw = {fw1 , . . . , fwN }, local models within N
sites, where wi is local model weights; 3. Y = {Y1, . . . , YN},
fMRI labels; 4. M(·), noise generator; 5. K, number of
optimization iterations; 6. τ , global model updating pace; 7.
M , privacy-preserving mechanism (explained in the following
section); 8. {opt1(·), . . . , optN (·)}, optimizer returning up-
dated model weights w.r.t. objective function L.
1: {w(0)1 , . . . , w(0)N } ← randomize parameters . initialize
local model
2: for k = 1 to K do
3: t← 0 . initialize pace counter
4: for n = 1 to N do
5: w
(k)
n ← optn(L(fw(k−1)n (Xn, Yn))
6: end for
7: t← t+ 1 . models communicate
8: if t%τ = 0 then
9: w¯(k) ← 1N
∑
n(w
(k)
n +M(w
(k)
n )) . update global
model per τ steps
10: for n = 1 to N do
11: w
(k)
n ← w¯(k) . deploy weights to local model
12: end for
13: end if
14: end for
Return: global model fw¯(K)
3) Randomized mechanism for privacy protection: Differ-
ential privacy [31], [32] is a popular approach to privacy-
preserving machine learning [13] and establishes a strong
standard for privacy guarantees for aggregated database-based
algorithms. Informally, differential privacy aims to provide a
4bound, , that the attacker could learn virtually nothing more
about an individual than they would learn if it were absent
from the dataset as the individual’s sensitive information is
almost irrelevant in the outputs of the model. The bound
 represents the degree of privacy preference that can be
controlled by each party. A lot of research has tried to
protect differential privacy at the data level when a model
is learned in a centralized manner [13], [33]. To protect
the data from inversion attack, such as inferring data from
model weights, a differential privacy-preserving randomized
mechanism can be incorporated into the learning process.
Given a deterministic real-valued function h : D → Rm, h’s
L1 sensitivity sh is defined as the maximum of the absolute
distance ‖ h(D)−h(D′) ‖1, where ‖ D−D′ ‖1= 1, meaning
that there is only one data point difference between D and
D′[31] (Definition 3.1). In our case h computes the m weight
parameters in the deep learning model. Introducing noise in
the training process (inputs, parameters, or outputs) can limit
the granularity of information shared and ensure -differential
privacy [32] (Definition 1) for the data point of any set S, and
then [34]:
Pr[h(D ∈ S)] ≤ ePr[h(D′ ∈ S)], (3)
or
Pr[h(D ∈ S)] ≤ ePr[h(D′ ∈ S)] + δ, (4)
where the additional additive term δ is the probability of -
differential privacy being broken. Here, we introduce two ap-
proaches: 1) Gaussian mechanism, and 2) Laplace mechanism,
which can enjoy good privacy guarantees [35] by adding noise
to the shared weights.
Gaussian Mechanism: The Gaussian mechanism adds
N(0, s2hσ
2) noise with mean 0 and standard deviation shσ to
a function h(D) with global sensitivity sh. h(D) will satisfy
(, δ)-differential privacy if δ ≥ 45 exp(−(σ)2/2) and  < 1
[31] (Theorem 3.22). Hereby, we linked the Gaussian noise
parameter σ to the privacy parameters  and δ.
Laplace Mechanism: The Laplace Distribution centered
at 0 with scale b is the distribution with probability density
function:
Lap(b) := Lap(x|b) = 1
2
exp(−|x|
b
), (5)
and the variance of the Laplace distribution is σ2 = 2b2.
The Laplace mechanism adds Lap(sh/) noise to a function
h(D) with global sensitivity sh and preserves (, 0)-difference
privacy. Hereby, we linked the Laplace noise parameter b to
the privacy parameters .
In our case, mapping function h is a deep learning model
and it is not tractable to compute the sensitivity sh. For
simplicity of discussion, sensitivity sh is assumed to be 1.
From the mechanisms described above, we can control noise
parameters to meet certain privacy requirement, as the noise
parameters are linked to privacy parameters as shown above.
B. Boosting multi-site learning with domain adaptation
Although federated learning is promising for better privacy
and efficiency, there is the additional issue that the data at
each site likely have different distributions, leading to domain
shift between the sites [36]. The main hypothesis here is
that domain adaptation techniques can improve accuracy in
a federated learning setting, and that holds even when noise is
added for privacy-preserving. In this subsection, we investigate
two domain adaptation methods: 1) Mixture of Experts (MoE),
adaptation near the output layer, and 2) Adversarial domain
alignment, adaptation on the data knowledge representation
level.
1) Mixture of Experts (MoE) domain adaptation: Mixture
of Experts (MoE) [37], [38], [39] is an approach to con-
ditionally combine experts to process each input. In deep
learning, experts mean deep learning models. An MoE layer
for feed-forward neural networks is a trainable gating network
that dynamically assigns gated weights to combine multiple
networks. Then, all parts of the big model that contains all
expert models and the MoE layer are trained jointly by back-
propagation.
Mixing the outputs of a collaboratively-learned general
model and a domain expert was proposed for domain adap-
tation [30]. Each participating party has an independent set
of labeled training examples that they wish to keep private,
drawn from a party-specific domain distribution. These users
collaborate to build a general model for the task but maintain
private, domain-adapted expert models. The final predictor is
a weighted average of the outputs from the general and private
models. These weights are learned using a MoE architecture
[37], so the entire model can be trained with gradient descent.
More specifically, given an input data x ∈ Xi, the output of
the global model is yG = fw¯(x). In the binary classification
setting, the output is the model’s predicted probability for the
positive class. As shown in Figure 3a, we train another local
model fφi in the meantime, which is defined as a private
model. The private model can have different architecture from
fw¯ and it does not communicate with the global model. The
output of the private model is yP = fφi(x). fφi is trained using
the regular deep learning setting, without including privacy-
related noise.
The final output that entity i uses to label data is
yˆi = ai(x)yG + (1− ai(x))yP . (6)
The weight ai(x) is called a gating function in the MoE,
and we use a non-linear layer ai(x) = σ(ψTi · x + bi) to
compute ai(x), where σ is the sigmoid function, and ψi and
bi are learned weights by end-to-end training together with the
federated learning architecture.
2) Adversarial domain alignment: In the federated setting,
the data are locally stored in a privacy-preserving manner.
For the domain adaptation problem, we have multiple source
domains and want to generalize the domains into a common
space of target data. Due to the data sharing limitation of
federated learning, we cannot train a single model that has
access to the source domain and target domain simultaneously.
To address this issue, we employed federated adversarial
alignment [29] that introduces two modules (a domain-specific
local feature extractor, and a global discriminator) in the
classification networks and divides optimization into two inde-
pendent steps. Using this method (Figure 3b), for source site
5(a) MoE strategy. (b) Adversarial alignment strategy
Fig. 3: Domain adaptation strategies for our proposed federated learning setup.
Algorithm 2 Federated Adversarial Domain Alignment
Input: 1. X = {X1, . . . , XN}, fMRI data from N
institutions/sites; 2. GθG = {GθG1 , . . . , GθGN }, local feature
generators within N sites, where θGn is the generator’s param-
eters of site n; 3. CθC = {CθC1 , . . . , CθCN }, local classifiers
within N sites, where θCn is the classifier’s parameters of
site n; 4. DθD = {DθD1 , . . . , DθDN }, discriminators from
embedded features, where θDn is the discriminator parameters
that identify the data from site n; 5. Y = {Y1, . . . , YN}, fMRI
labels (HC or ASD); 6. M(·), noise generator; 7. K, number
of optimization iterations; 8. τ , global model updating pace;
9. {Gθ¯G ,Cθ¯c}, global model.
1: Initialize parameters {θG, θC , θD}
2: for k = 1 to K do
3: t← 0 . initialize pace counter
4: for i = 1 to N do
5: Sample mini-batch from source site
{(XSi , Y Si )}Ni=1 and target site {(XTj )}Nj=1
6: Compute gradient with cross-entropy classification
loss Lce (Eq. 2) to update θ(k)Gi and θ
(k)
Ci
7: Domain Alignment:
8: Update θ(k)Di , {θ
(k)
Gi
, θ
(k)
Gj
} with Eq. 7 and Eq. 8
respectively to align the domain distribution
9: end for
10: t← t+ 1 . models communicate
11: if t%τ = 0 then
12: θ¯
(k)
G ← 1N
∑
n(θ
(k)
Gi
+M(θ
(k)
Gi
))
13: θ¯
(k)
C ← 1N
∑
n(θ
(k)
Ci
+M(θ
(k)
Ci
)) . update global
model per τ steps
14: for n = 1 to N do
15: θ
(k)
Gi
← θ¯(k)G
16: θ
(k)
Ci
← θ¯(k)C . deploy weights to local model
17: end for
18: end if
19: end for
Return: global model {Gθ¯G ,Cθ¯c}
Ds, we train a local feature extractor, Gs. For the target site
Dt, we train a local feature generator Gt. For each (Ds,Dt)
source-target domain pair, we train an adversarial domain
discriminator D to align the distributions. First, domain dis-
criminator D is trained to identify which domain the features
come from, then the feature generators (Gs, Gt) are trained to
confuse the discriminator D. In this setting, the discriminator
D only gets access to the output features with noise coverage
of Gs and Gt, without plagiarizing the original data. Given
the source domain data XS and target data XT , the objective
for discriminating the source domain from the others Ds is
defined as:
LadvD(XS ,XT , Gs, Gt) =− Exs∼XS [logDs(Gs(xs))]
− Ext∼XT [log(1−Ds(Gt(xt)))].
(7)
In the second step, LadvD remains unchanged, but LadvG is
updated with the following objective:
LadvG(XS ,XT , Gs, Gt) =− Exs∼XS [logDs(Gs(xs))]
− Ext∼XT [log(Ds(Gt(xt))].
(8)
By end-to-end training of the federated learning model with
the alignment module, we can minimize the discrepancy
between the source and target domains. The implementation
details are described in Algorithm 2.
C. Evaluate model by interpreting biomarkers
The primary goal of psychiatric neuroimaging research is to
identify objective and repeatable biomarkers that may inform
the disease [40]. Finding the biomarkers associated with ASD
is extremely helpful in understanding the underlying roots
of the disorder and can lead to earlier diagnosis and more
targeted treatment. Alteration in brain functional connectivity
is expected to provide potential biomarkers for classifying or
predicting brain disorders [41]. Deep learning methods are
promising tools for investigating the reliability of patterns of
brain function across large and heterogeneous data sets [42].
6We held the hypothesis that reliable biomarkers could be
detected from a reliable model. The guided gradient-based
explanation method [43], [44] is perhaps the most straight-
forward and easiest approach for data feature importance
interpretation. The advantage of gradient-based explanation
method is easy to compute. By calculating the difference of the
output w.r.t the model input then applying norm, a score can
be obtained. The gradient-based score can be used to indicate
the relative importance of the input feature since it represents
the change in input space, which corresponds to the positive
maximizing rate of change in the model output.
gck = ReLU
(
∂yˆc
∂xk
)
(9)
where c ∈ {0, . . . , C − 1} is the correct class of input, and
yc is the score for class c before softmax layer, xk is the kth
feature of the input. gck can indicate the importance of feature
k for classifying an input as class c. We use this method to
interpret the important features (ROIs) as biomarkers.
Given the important biomarkers, first, we propose to exam-
ine their consistency, i.e., whether the biomarkers are repli-
cable across different datasets. Second, we should examine
whether the biomarkers are meaningful. For the relatively
important features selected, such as the features with the
top K important scores, we can ”decode” them to asso-
ciated functional keywords based on prior knowledge and
compute the correlation score vckeyword for the keyword with
the biomarkers in class c. The informative biomarkers of
the inputs in the different classes c should have different
functional representations, which means we expect large |∆| =
|vckeyword − vc
′
keyword| for the informative biomarkers, where
c′ ∈ C \ c . The larger the difference, the more representative
and informative the biomarkers.
IV. EXPERIMENTS AND RESULTS
A. Data
1) Participants: The study was carried out using resting-
state fMRI (rs-fMRI) data from the Autism Brain Imaging
Data Exchange dataset (ABIDE I preprocessed, [10]). ABIDE
is a consortium that provides preciously collected rs-fMRI
ASD and matched controls data for the purpose of data sharing
in the scientific community. However, in reality, collecting data
in a consortium like ABIDE is not easy as strict agreement
need to be reached by different parties. Therefore, although
the data were shared in ABIDE, we studied the multi-site
data from the federated learning perspective. To ensure the
deep learning model could be performed on a single site,
we downloaded Regions of Interests (ROIs) fMRI series of
the top four largest sites (UM1, NYU, USM, UCLA1) from
the preprocessed ABIDE dataset with Configurable Pipeline
for the Analysis of Connectomes (CPAC), band-pass filtering
(0.01 - 0.1 Hz), no global signal regression, parcellated by
Harvard-Oxford (HO) atlas. Skipping subjects lacking file-
name, we downloaded 106, 175, 72, 71 subjects from UM1,
NYU, USM, UCLA1 separately. HO parcellated each brain
into 111 ROIs. Since some subjects did not contain complete
ROIs, we removed the incomplete data, resulting in 88, 167,
52, 63 subjects for UM1, NYU, USM, UCLA1 separately.
Due to a lack of sufficient data, we used sliding windows
(with window size 32 and stride 1) to truncate raw time
sequences of fMRI. After removing incomplete subjects, the
compositions of four sites are shown in Table I. We denoted
UM for UM1 and UCLA for UCLA1. We summarized the
phenotype information of the subjects under our study in Table
II.
NYU UM USM UCLA
Total Subject 167 88 52 63
ASD Subject 73 43 33 37
HC Subject 94 45 19 26
ASD Percentage 44% 49% 63% 59%
fMRI Frames 176 296 236 116
Overlapping Trunc 145 265 205 85
TABLE I: Data summary of the dataset used in our study
2) Data preprocessing: The task we performed on the
ABIDE datasets was to identify autism spectrum disorders
(ASD) or healthy control (HC). We used the mean time
sequences of ROIs to compute the correlation matrix as
functional connectivity. The functional connectivity provided
an index of the level of co-activation of brain regions based
on the time series of rs-fMRI brain imaging data. Each
element of the correlation matrix was calculated using Pearson
correlation coefficient, which ranged from -1 to 1: values
close to 1 indicated that the time series were highly correlated
and values close to -1 indicate that the time series are anti-
correlated. Then, we applied the Fisher transformation on the
correlation matrices to emphasize the strong correlations. As
the correlation matrices were symmetric, we only kept the
upper-triangle of the matrices and flattened the triangle values
to vectors, with the purpose of using them for the inputs
of multilayer perceptron (MLP) classifiers. The number of
resultant features was defined by R(R − 1)/2, where R was
the number of ROIs. Under the HO atlas (111 ROIs), the
procedure resulted in 6105 features.
B. Federated training setup and hyper-parameters discussion
A multi-layer perceptron (MLP) 6105-16-2 (corresponding
to 6105 nodes for the input (first) layer, 16 nodes for the
hidden layer, and 2 nodes for the output layer) was used for
classification. The outputs of the MLPs were the probability of
the given input being classified as each class. We used cross-
entropy as the objective function. We performed 5-fold cross-
SITE AGE ADOS IQ SEX
ASD
UM 12.4(2.2) - 102.8(18.8) M 36 F 7
USM 22.9(7.3) 12.6(3.0) 99.8(16.4) M 33 F 0
NYU 14.7(7.1) 11.5(4.1) 107.4(16.5) M 65 F 8
UCLA 13.0(2.7) 10.4(3.6) 103.5(13.5) M 31 F 6
HC
UM 14.1(3.4) - 106.7(9.6) M 32 F 13
USM 20.8(8.2) - 117.1(14.4) M 19 F 0
NYU 15.2(5.9) - 112.6(13.5) M 69 F 25
UCLA 13.4(2.3) - 104.9(10.4) M 22 F 4
Values reported with mean (std) format. M: Male, F: Female, ADOS score:
- means information not available
TABLE II: Data phenotype summary.
7validation (subject-wise splitting), and each entry of the input
vectors was normalized by training set mean and standard
deviation (std) within each site. As we performed overlapping
truncation for data augmentation in data processing, we used
the majority voting method to evaluate the final classification
performance. For example, we augmented m input instances
for a single subject, and if more than m/2 instances were
classified as ASD, then we assigned ’ASD’ label to the subject.
Adam optimization was applied with initial learning rate 1e-
5 and reduced by 1/2 for every 20 epochs and stopped at
the 50th epoch. In each epoch, we performed local updates
multiple times instead of once based on communication pace
τ . We set the total steps of each epoch as 60, and the batch
size of each site was the number of training data over 60.
First, we investigated the effects of changing communica-
tion pace on classification accuracy, as communication be-
tween models would be costly. To select the best communica-
tion pace τ , we did not apply any noise on the shared weights
in the experiment. As the results in Figure 4 show, there was
no significant difference between the accuracies when τ varied
from 5 to 30.
Fig. 4: Investigate communication pace τ vs accuracy
Then, we investigated adding the randomization mecha-
nism on shared weights to protect the data from inversion
attack, such as inferring data from model weights, given local
model weights. Here we tested the Gaussian and Laplace
mechanism, which corresponded to L2 and L1 sensitivity.
Institutions may want to specify the level of privacy they want
to preserve, which would be reflected in the noise levels. For
the Gaussian mechanism experiment, we generated Gaussian
noise εn ∼ N(0, ασ) adding to local model weights, where
σ is the standard deviation of the local model weights and
α is the noise level. We varied α from 0.001 to 1. For the
Laplace mechanism experiment, we generated Laplace noise
εn ∼ Lap(ασ/
√
2) adding to local model weights, where α
was the scale parameter, and σ was the standard deviation
of the local model weights. We varied α from 0.001 to 1.
As the results in Figure 5 and Figure 6 show, there was a
trade-off between model performance and noise level (privacy-
preserving level). When the noise level was too high (α = 1
in our setup), corresponding to high privacy-preserving levels,
the models failed in the classification task.
Fig. 5: Investigate Gaussian mechanism vs accuracy
Fig. 6: Investigate Laplace mechanism vs accuracy
C. Comparisons with different strategies
To demonstrate the proposed federated learning framework
in Algorithm 1 (Fed) could improve multi-site fMRI classi-
fication, we compared the proposed methods (τ = 20 and
α = 0.01) with four alternative, non-federated strategies:
1) training and testing within the single site (Single); 2)
training using one site and testing on another site (Cross);
3) collecting multi-site data together for training (Mix) and 4)
creating an ensemble model using the models from different
sites (Ensemble). Ensemble method combines the Single model
trained within the site and Cross model trained by other sites
by averaging the outputs. Single and Cross preserve data
privacy, while cannot incorporate the data. Mix can take use
of all the data from different sites, while cannot preserve data
privacy. The classification performance of Mix was expected to
perform better than Fed as it used more data information. Due
to the data size limitation in training deep learning model in
Single, Cross and Ensemble, we changed the MLP architecture
to 6105-8-2, while all the other training settings and data
splitting settings were the same as described in Section IV-B.
Considering the fact that data distribution was heteroge-
neous, we also tried to use the domain adaptation methods
introduced in Section III-B to boost the classification per-
formance of Fed. For the combination of federated training
and MoE (Fed-MoE) strategy, we trained a private classifier
simultaneously with the federated architecture. The same as
Single, we used MLPs 6105-8-2 as the private models. The
gate function was implemented by an MLP with two fully-
connected (FC) layers 6105-8-1 and a sigmoid non-linearity
8Fig. 7: Different classification strategies
layer. For the combination of federated training and adversarial
alignment (Fed-Align) strategy, we used four discriminators D
to discriminate whether the data came from the source domain.
We treated the first two layers of the federated MLPs 6105-16
as a feature generator G, and each site had a different G. The
input of the classifier C was a 16-dim vector. The global model
was the concatenation of G− C. Only the G and C weights
of local models were shared with the global model. For the
whole network training, the setup was the same as training
a Fed model, except that we started to propagate adversarial
loss on D (Eq. 7) after training the G-C part for 5 epochs.
How to utilize data for training and testing in different
classification strategies was explained in Figure 7. All the
implemented model architectures are shown in the Appendix.
The comparison results were shown in Table III. In Cross,
we denoted the site used for training as ’tr<site>’. As
the testing data were all the other whole sites, there was
no standard deviation (std) to report. Also, we ignored the
performance of the site used for training. The other results
were reported using the ’mean (std)’ format. By comparing
the mean accuracy only, we highlighted the best accuracy
in Table III. The reason why Cross results were better than
Single was probably because more data were included in
training (no data splitting). For example, the total number
of training instances at the UCLA site with Single strategy
was 85 × 63 × 0.8 (5-fold) = 4284, while using the Cross
strategy training on the USM site then testing on the UCLA
site included 205× 52 = 10660 training instances. Ensemble
results were not good, probably because the ensemble methods
could not make use of the decisions made by different models
and counter-productively weakened the prediction power. The
mean accuracy of Fed was higher than the best Cross learning
NYU UM USM UCLA
trNYU - 0.716 0.673 0.682
trUM 0.611 - 0.712 0.682
trUSM 0.641 0.625 - 0.730
trUCLA 0.575 0.648 0.750 -
Single 0.601(0.064) 0.648(0.065) 0.695(0.108) 0.571(0.100)
Ensemble 0.611(0.012) 0.638(0.054) 0.654(0.088) 0.634(0.064)
Fed 0.647(0.049) 0.728(0.073) 0.849(0.124) 0.712(0.075)
Fed-MoE 0.671(0.082) 0.728(0.083) 0.809(0.098) 0.744(0.130)
Fed-Align 0.676(0.071) 0.751(0.053) 0.829(0.091) 0.712(0.089)
Mix 0.671(0.035) 0.740(0.063) 0.829(0.137) 0.710(0.128)
TABLE III: Results of using different training strategies
case for each single site. In addition, Fed was significantly
better than Single by two sample t test with p < 0.001
for each site. We also observed that Fed-MoE (p = 0.003)
and Fed-Align (p < 0.001) significantly improved accuracy
on NYU site when comparing with Fed. The accuracy on
UM site using Fed-Align was significantly better than the
accuracy using Fed (p = 0.018).The accuracy on UCLA site
using Fed-MoE showed potential to improve the classification
results compared with using Fed (p = 0.094). Using domain
adaptation methods did not improve the performance on the
USM site, which was probably caused by the data distribution
of the USM site. We validate the hypothesis in the following
discussion.
D. Evaluate model from interpretation perspective
We tried to understand the model mechanism by interpreting
how each model made a particular decision and how the
adaptation methods affected the decision-making process.
1) Aligned feature embedding: We used t-SNE [45] to
visualize the latent space embedded by the first fully connected
9layer in Figure 8a and Figure 8b for our federated learning
model without and with adversarial domain alignment. We
found the alignment method overall improved domain adapta-
tion. In Figure 8a, we also noticed that the features of the USM
site (blue crosses) mixed with other domains. We assumed that
could be the reason why the adversarial domain alignment
methods did not improve federated learning accuracy for the
USM site.
(a) Embedded latent features
from 4 sites without alignment.
(b) Embedded latent features
from 4 sites with alignment.
Fig. 8: t-SNE visualization of latent space.
2) MoE gating value: The core of MoE was to mix the
outputs of a collaboratively-learned global model and a private
model in each site. Over time, a site’s gate function a(x)
learned whether to trust the global model or the private model
more for a given input. The private model needed to perform
well on only the subset of the data points for which the
global model failed. While the global model still benefited
from the data product (model weights) sharing but received
weaker updates on these hard ”private” data points. This meant
that users with unusual domains had a smaller effect on the
global model, which might increase their ability to generalize
[46]. We show the gating value associated with a federated
global model for each testing data point in Figure 9. Again,
we noticed that the gating values were almost uniformly
distributed in the range [0, 1], which meant the MoE layer
functioned as an inter-medium to coordinate the decisions of
the private and global model, except that the gating values of
USM site were skewed to 0s and 1s. This showed evidence for
why Fed-MoE did not perform better than Fed on the USM
site.
Fig. 9: The histogram of MoE gated values assigned to
federated global model.
Sementic Comprehension Social Attention Memory Reward
Fed
HC 0.054 0.096 0.099 0.088 0.009 -0.078
ASD -0.048 -0.035 -0.081 0.007 0.031 0.017
|∆| 0.102 0.131 0.180 0.081 0.022 0.095
Single
HC 0.050 0.043 0.069 0.053 0.022 -0.062
ASD -0.029 -0.005 -0.094 0.005 0.041 0.010
|∆| 0.079 0.048 0.163 0.048 0.019 0.072
|∆| is the absolute difference between the scores of HC and ASC
groups.
TABLE IV: Correlations between the detected biomarkers and
functional keywords maps decoded by Neurosynth.
3) Neural patterns: connectivity in the autistic brain:
Whether informative and replicable biomarkers can be inter-
preted is another dimension to evaluate a deep learning model
apart from using accuracy-related metrics. Here, we used the
guided back-propagation method (Eq. 9) to interpret feature
importance on Fed and Single model separately. The features
of inputs were the functional connectivity between brain ROIs.
First, we calculated gc = [gck]
6105
k=1 for each testing point. To
get the ROI level evaluation, we built a symmetric grad matrix
G where the ijth entry is the gc of functional connectivity
between ROI i and j. We summed G over columns resulting
in a 111-dim vector sc standing for the importance score
of the 111 ROIs. We normalized sc = [scr]
111
r=1 by dividing
max(sc) to bound it to [0, 1]. We averaged the results for all
the test data points in each site. The ROIs with the top 10
important scores for classification (2 classes) and normalized
importance scores on the ROIs were plotted for HC (Figure
10) and ASD (Figure 11). Fed detected replicable and robust
biomarkers across 4 sites, while the biomarkers detected by
Single are different across different sites. Further, we listed the
correlations between the biomarkers with functional keyword
maps in Table IV by Neurosynth [47]. The biomarkers detected
by Fed were more distinguishable than those of Single, as the
differences between correlation values for HC and ASD group
were larger than those of Single (see the |∆| scores of Fed are
larger than those of Single in Table IV). Therefore, we thought
the biomarkers detected by Fed were more informative. We
could infer from Table IV that the semantic, comprehension,
social and attention-related functional connectivity was more
salient in the HC group, while memory and reward-related
functional connectivity was more salient in the ASD group.
Hence, the biomarkers detected by Fed were more replicable
and informative. The names of the biomarkers of each group
detected by Fed and Single were listed in the Appendix.
E. Limitation and discussion
Although, based on our empirical investigation that the
communication pace, which controls how often the local and
global model update the weight information, did not affect the
classification performance, we could not draw the conclusion
that the pace parameter was irrelevant. A more extensive
range of pace values should be examined according to the
application. Also, we used practical approaches to investigate
privacy-preserving mechanisms. However, the sensitivity of
the mapping function h : D → Rm, the deep learning
classifier in our case, was difficult to estimate. Hence, we
did not explicitly give the bound . A recent study [48]
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(a) Biomarkers using Fed strategy
- view 1.
(b) Biomarkers using Single strat-
egy - view 1.
(c) Biomarkers using Fed strategy
- view 2.
(d) Biomarkers using Single strat-
egy - view 2.
Fig. 10: Interpreting brain biomarkers associated with identifying HC from federated learning model (Fed) and using single
site data for training (Single). The colors stand for the relative important scores of the ROIs and the values are denoted on the
color bar. The names of the strategies and sites are denoted on the left-upper corners of each subfigure. Each row shows the
results of NYU, UM, USM, UCLA site from top to bottom.
(a) Biomarkers using Fed strategy
- view 1.
(b) Biomarkers using Single strat-
egy - view 1.
(c) Biomarkers using Fed strategy
- view 2.
(d) Biomarkers using Single strat-
egy - view 2.
Fig. 11: Interpreting brain biomarkers associated with identifying ASD from federated learning model (Fed) and using single
site data for training (Single). The colors stand for the relative important scores of the ROIs and the values are denoted on the
color bar. The names of the strategies and sites are denoted on the left-upper corners of each subfigure. Each row shows the
results of NYU, UM, USM, UCLA site from top to bottom.
also demonstrated Gaussian and Laplace noise higher than a
certain scale can be a good defense to reconstruction attack.
According to the specific application and dataset, we can
empirically estimate a suitable noise level from attacking
perspective as well. In our experiments, we used the aver-
aging method to incorporate models’ outputs for Ensemble.
To achieve better performance for Ensemble, more advanced
ensemble methods could be exploited, such as gradient tree
boosting, stacking, and forest of randomized trees [49]. We
evaluated the biomarkers at the ROI-level. The functional
connectivity also could be used as biomarkers. More advanced
deep learning models can be explored as well. In order to
show the strong direct associations between the biomarkers
and disease diagnosis or treatment outcome prediction, down-
stream tasks such as regression to ADOS scores using the
biomarkers are worthy of exploring. We found that domain
adaptation methods were not always a beneficial addition to
the federated model. We could examine the distribution of
the latent features of different data owners first, then decide
whether to adopt our proposed domain adaptation methods.
V. CONCLUSION
11
In this work, we have presented a privacy-preserving fed-
erated learning framework for multi-site fMRI analysis. We
have investigated the communication pace and the privacy-
preserving randomized mechanisms for the problem of using
brain functional connectivity to classify ASD and HC. To
overcome the domain shift issue, we have proposed two
strategies: MoE and adversarial domain alignment to boost
federated learning model performance. We have also evaluated
the deep learning model for neuroimaging from the biomarker
detection perspective.
Our results have demonstrated the advantage of using a
federated framework to utilize multi-site data without data
sharing compared to alternative methods. We have shown
federated learning performance can potentially be boosted
by adding domain adaptation and discussed the condition of
benefits. In addition, the proposed federated learning model
has revealed possible brain biomarkers for identifying ASD.
Our work also has broader implications into other disease
areas, particularly rare diseases with fewer patients. In these
situations, utilizing data across multiple sites is critical and
required for meaningful conclusions.
Our approach brings new hope for accelerating deep learn-
ing applications in the field of medical imaging, where data
isolation and the emphasis on data privacy have become
challenges. It can establish a unified model for multiple med-
ical institutions while protecting local data, allowing medical
institutions to work together with the required data security.
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APPENDIX
Architecture of the models
We provide the detailed model architecture for each
strategy we used in our study. For each fully connected
(FC), we provide the input and output dimension. For
drop-out (Dropout) layers, we provide the probability of an
element to be zeroed. We denote batch normalization layers
as (BN), relu layers as (ReLU) and softmax layers as Softmax.
Models for Single, Cross and Ensemble are shown in Table
V.
Layer Configuration
MLPs
1 Dropout (0.5), FC (6105, 8), ReLU, BN
2 Dropout (0.5), FC (8, 2), ReLU, BN, Softmax
TABLE V: Model architecture for ABIDE rs-fMRI classifica-
tion task under Single, Cross and Ensemble strategies.
Models for Cross and Ensemble is shown in Table VI.
Layer Configuration
MLPs
1 Dropout (0.5), FC (6105, 16), ReLU, BN
2 Dropout (0.5), FC (16, 2), ReLU, BN, Softmax
TABLE VI: Model architecture for ABIDE rs-fMRI classifi-
cation task under Fed and Mix strategies.
Models for Fed-MoE strategy is shown in Table VII.
Layer Configuration Layer Configuration
Private Model Global Model
1
Dropout (0.5),
FC (6105,8),
ReLU, BN
1
Dropout (0.5),
FC (6105,16),
ReLU, BN
2
Dropout (0.5),
FC (8,2),
ReLU, BN
2
Dropout (0.5),
FC (16,2),
ReLU, BN
Layer Configuration
MoE
1 FC (2,1), Sigmoid
TABLE VII: Model architecture for ABIDE rs-fMRI classifi-
cation task under Fed-MoE strategy.
Models for Fed-Align strategy is shown in Table VIII
Layer Configuration
Feature Generator
1 Dropout (0.5), FC (6105, 16), ReLU, BN
Domain Discriminator
1 FC (6105, 8), ReLU
2 FC (8, 1), sigmoid
Classifier
1 Dropout (0.5), FC (16, 2), ReLU, BN, Softmax
TABLE VIII: Model architecture for ABIDE rs-fMRI classi-
fication task under Fed-Align strategy.
Names of the biomarkers
We list the top 10 important ROIs (plotted in Figure 10
and Figure 11 in descending order.
1. HC biomarkers detected by Fed:
NYU : ’Left Central Opercular Cortex’ ’Right Precuneous Cor-
tex’ ’Right Inferior Frontal Gyrus’ ’Right Middle Tempo-
ral Gyrus’ ’Right Occipital Pole’ ’Left Middle Temporal
Gyrus’ ’Right Inferior Temporal Gyrus’ ’Right Supra-
marginal Gyrus’ ’Right Angular Gyrus’ ’Left Frontal
Operculum Cortex’
UM : ’Left Central Opercular Cortex’ ’Right Precuneous
Cortex’ ’Right Inferior Frontal Gyrus’ ’Right Middle
Temporal Gyrus’ ’Right Occipital Pole’ ’Left Middle
Temporal Gyrus’ ’Right Supramarginal Gyrus’ ’Right
Inferior Temporal Gyrus’ ’Right Angular Gyrus’ ’Left
Frontal Operculum Cortex’
USM : ’Left Central Opercular Cortex’ ’Right Precuneous
Cortex’ ’Right Inferior Frontal Gyrus’ ’Right Middle
Temporal Gyrus’ ’Right Occipital Pole’ ’Left Middle
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Temporal Gyrus’ ’Right Angular Gyrus’ ’Left Frontal
Operculum Cortex’ ’Right Supramarginal Gyrus’ ’Right
Inferior Temporal Gyrus’
UCLA : ’Right Temporal Occipital Fusiform Cortex’ ’Right
Angular Gyrus’ ’Left Occipital Pole’ ’Right Middle Tem-
poral Gyrus’ ’Left Cingulate Gyrus’ ’Left Frontal Medial
Cortex’ ’Right Paracingulate Gyrus’ ’Left Temporal Pole’
’Left Middle Temporal Gyrus’ ’Right Superior Temporal
Gyrus’
2. HC biomarkers detected by Single:
NYU : ’Right Angular Gyrus’ ’Left Occipital Pole’ ’Right Tem-
poral Occipital Fusiform Cortex’ ’Left Temporal Pole’
’Right Middle Temporal Gyrus’ ’Left Postcentral Gyrus’
’Right Inferior Temporal Gyrus’ ’Left Frontal Pole’ ’Left
Supramarginal Gyrus’ ’Left Temporal Occipital Fusiform
Cortex’
UM : ’Right Temporal Occipital Fusiform Cortex’ ’Right
Angular Gyrus’ ’Right Paracingulate Gyrus’ ’Right Supe-
rior Temporal Gyrus’ ’Left Temporal Pole’ ’Left Central
Opercular Cortex’ ’Left Frontal Medial Cortex’ ’Right
Supramarginal Gyrus’ ’Left Superior Parietal Lobule’
’Right Superior Parietal Lobule’
USM : ’Right Angular Gyrus’ ’Right Temporal Occipital
Fusiform Cortex’ ’Right Superior Parietal Lobule’ ’Left
Occipital Pole’ ’Left Temporal Pole’ ’Right Middle Tem-
poral Gyrus’ ’Right Paracingulate Gyrus’ ’Right Lateral
Occipital Cortex’ ’Left Angular Gyrus’ ’Left Hippocam-
pus’
UCLA : ’Right Temporal Occipital Fusiform Cortex’ ’Right
Angular Gyrus’ ’Left Occipital Pole’ ’Right Middle Tem-
poral Gyrus’ ’Left Cingulate Gyrus’ ’Left Frontal Medial
Cortex’ ’Right Paracingulate Gyrus’ ’Left Temporal Pole’
’Left Middle Temporal Gyrus’ ’Right Superior Temporal
Gyrus’
3. ASD biomarkers detected by Fed:
NYU : ’Left Accumbens’ ’Left Parahippocampal Gyrus’ ’Right
Thalamus’ ”Right Heschl’s Gyrus (includes H1 and H2)”
’Right Pallidum’ ’Left Middle Frontal Gyrus’ ’Right
Precentral Gyrus’ ’Right Parahippocampal Gyrus’ ’Left
Cuneal Cortex’ ’Left Temporal Fusiform Cortex’
UM : ’Left Accumbens’ ’Left Parahippocampal Gyrus’ ’Right
Thalamus’ ”Right Heschl’s Gyrus (includes H1 and H2)”
’Right Pallidum’ ’Right Parahippocampal Gyrus’ ’Left
Middle Frontal Gyrus’ ’Right Precentral Gyrus’ ’Left
Cuneal Cortex’ ’Left Temporal Fusiform Cortex’
USM : ’Left Accumbens’ ’Left Parahippocampal Gyrus’ ’Right
Thalamus’ ’Right Pallidum’ ”Right Heschl’s Gyrus (in-
cludes H1 and H2)” ’Left Middle Frontal Gyrus’ ’Right
Parahippocampal Gyrus’ ’Right Precentral Gyrus’ ’Left
Temporal Fusiform Cortex’ ’Left Cuneal Cortex’
UCLA : ’Left Accumbens’ ’Left Parahippocampal Gyrus’ ’Right
Thalamus’ ”Right Heschl’s Gyrus (includes H1 and H2)”
’Right Pallidum’ ’Left Middle Frontal Gyrus’ ’Right
Parahippocampal Gyrus’ ’Right Precentral Gyrus’ ’Left
Cuneal Cortex’ ’Left Temporal Fusiform Cortex’
4. ASD biomarkers detected by Single:
NYU : ’Left Cuneal Cortex’ ’Right Central Opercular Cortex’
’Left Putamen’ ’Left Thalamus’ ’Left Supracalcarine
Cortex’ ’Left Superior Temporal Gyrus’ ’Left Parahip-
pocampal Gyrus’ ’Left Middle Frontal Gyrus’ ’Right
Thalamus’ ’Left Accumbens’
UM : ’Left Supracalcarine Cortex’ ’Left Accumbens’ ’Right
Precentral Gyrus’ ’Left Subcallosal Cortex’ ’Left Cuneal
Cortex’ ’Left Lateral Occipital Cortex’ ’Left Inferior
Frontal Gyrus’ ’Left Hippocampus’ ’Right Temporal
Pole’ ’Right Pallidum’
USM : ’Left Cuneal Cortex’ ’Left Putamen’ ’Left Superior
Temporal Gyrus’ ’Right Precentral Gyrus’ ’Right Tempo-
ral Pole’ ’Right Inferior Temporal Gyrus’ ’Left Caudate’
’Right Pallidum’ ’Left Lingual Gyrus’ ’Left Precentral
Gyrus’
UCLA : ’Left Putamen’ ’Left Cuneal Cortex’ ’Left Superior
Temporal Gyrus’ ’Right Inferior Temporal Gyrus’ ’Left
Lingual Gyrus’ ’Left Caudate’ ’Left Precentral Gyrus’
’Left Lateral Occipital Cortex’ ’Right Precentral Gyrus’
’Right Central Opercular Cortex’
